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24. 2. 65.	COS. H 9/65.	1A
7. 4. 67.	FO/CO. Christian Missions (C) 70	2A
4. 4. 67.	Aden TO. FO TEL 348.	C 3A
5. 4. 67.	Aden FO TEL 352.	C 4A
5. 4. 67.	UK Miss. N. YORK. TO. FO 618	C 5A
6. 4. 67.	UK. Miss. N. YORK. TO. FO 628.	C 6A
7. 4. 67.	Aden. I-O. P. 365	C 7A
7. 4. 67.	Aden. F. O. 369.	C 8A
7. 4. 67.	FO to Aden. 538.	S 9A
7. 4. 67.	Aden. TO. FO 236.	C 10A
7. 4. 67.	FO/CO. Christian Missions. 66.	C 11A
7. 4. 67.	FO/CO. Christian Missions 67	C 12A
8. 4. 67.	Aden. TO. FO. 372.	C 13A
8. 4. 67.	Aden. TO. F. O. 376.	S 14A
8. 4. 67.	Aden. TO. F. O. 383.	C 15A
8. 4. 67.	Aden. TO. FO 381.	C 16A
8. 4. 67.	Aden. TO. FO 378.	S 17A
8. 4. 67.	Aden. TO. F. O. 379.	C 18A
9. 4. 67.	Aden. TO. F. O. 387.	S 19A
9. 4. 67.	UK Miss. GRENADA. TO F. O. 317.	C 20A
10. 4. 67.	UK Miss. GRENADA TO F. O. 322.	C 21A
11. 4. 67.	UK Miss. GRENADA. TO. F. O. 334.	C 22A
19. 4. 67.	NOTES ON FEDERAL REVENUE ARMY. APRIL. 1967 REVIS.	C 23A

Date: Minutes and Brief Details of Enclosure	Clas.	Encl. No.
22.4.67. Richmond TO W.I.D.	5	24
6.5.67. C.M.C.M.E. TO MOD(UK) DTG. 061121	5	25
6.5.67. W.E.L.F. TO MOD(Army) DTG. 060846	5	26
11.5.67. MOD(UK) TO C.M.C.M.E. DTG. 111355	75	27
18.5.67. C.M.C.M.E. TO MOD(UK) DTG. 181150	5	28
20.6.67. B.A.R.T.L.K.T. TO W.I.D. 5105 PR COVER NOTE.	S	29*
THE IMPACT OF RECENT EVENTS IN THE EAST ON THE ARMED FORCES.	S	29A
26.6.67. B.A.R.T.L.K.T. TO W.I.D. 5105 PR LETTERS DISTURBANCES WITHIN THE SA FORCES. 36/6/67.	5	30
17.6.67. B.A.R.T.L.K.T. TO D.F.P. 5232. P.R. NOTES ON S.A.A. JUNE, 1967.	-	39
4.7.67. FOOSIE MINUTE. MIDDLE. EAST 1000.	S	32
18.7.67. TEL. F.O. 10 UK Miss. NEW YORK.	C	33
2.8.67. F.O/CO TO CERTAIN MISSIONS. 194	C	34
6.8.67. ADEN. F.O. TEL. 1099.	C	35
12.8.67. F.O. ADEN. 1369.	R	36
15.8.67. ADEN. TO F.O. 1177.	C	37
17.8.67. ADEN. TO F.O. 1201.	C	38
19.8.67. UK Miss. GRENADA. TO F.O. 742.	C	39
21.8.67. HANCOM. ADEN. F.O. 1233.	C	40
21.8.67. C.M.C.M.E. TO MOD(UK) DTG. 211305.	R	41
22.8.67. UK Miss. GRENADA. TO F.O. 750.	C	42
23.8.67. UK Miss. GRENADA. TO F.O. 754.	C	43
24.8.67. C.M.C.M.E. TO MOD(UK) DTG. 241040	S	44
25.8.67. ADEN. TO F.O.	S	45
25.8.67. 612 (67) SA. 99.	S	46

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Clas. Encl. No.

12. 9. 67. TEC (67) SA 102

S. 47

11. 11. 67. SMARLKT TO WLD

S. 48

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REPORT ON S. ARMENIAN Agency.

S. 49

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S. 49

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South Arabian Army

The undermentioned reports which are attached have been received from the psyops representative with the SSA. The reports are only a personal representation of events as he saw them and his assessment, but are considered to be of considerable interest.

Annex B and C to Civil Affairs BFG BFG/CA dated 28 Oct 67.

Annex A to Civil Affairs BFG 8509/BFG dated 11 Nov 67

Abolinti
(J.A. WHITE)

Major
for Deputy Director of
Forward Plans
(NB 2415)

17 November 1967

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ANNEX B
TO CIVIL AFFAIRS BFG BFC/CA
DATED 25 OCT 67

SOUTH ARABIAN ARMY

1. Morale throughout the Army has now descended to that of any purely mercenary force. The loyalty of each individual member to the SAA is based solely upon the fact that this is his best source of income, and by remaining in the Army he is far better off than his civilian counterpart, particularly at this time when unemployment is rife.

2. It was extremely unfortunate, but perhaps inevitable that the Aulaqi/non-Aulaqi tribal dispute which was originally not in direct parallel with the FLOSY/non-FLOSY political squabble, should have been forced into direct FLOSY (Aulaqi) v NLF (non-Aulaqi) alignment. With either, or both, tribal and political pressures brought to bear, every member of the SAA has had, perforce, to declare himself for one side or the other; there are no "neutrals".

3. There now remain seconded to the SAA a mere 15 British Officers and about 40 Other Ranks. None of these is up country, all, save the Commander are in technical or advisory capacities. It will thus be seen that apart from keeping their fingers on the pulse for the Cend and providing reliable liaison with HQ MDC, these officers can do little to stop any underhand manipulations by senior Arab Officers.

4. The Aulaqi/non-Aulaqi balance within the Force is 22/78% all ranks, but 39/61% officers. Of the latter the smaller percentage, (Aulaqi Officers), hold most of the key appointments: the two senior Colonels; seven of the ten battalion commanders, and several key staff appointments (including AA&QMC).

5. It would thus appear that the Aulaqi faction have a stranglehold, but this has, to a great extent, been neutralised by the fact that the South Arabian Police (formerly Federal Guard II) are almost entirely NLF, efficiently guided by Adel Hali, the Commissioner of Aden State Police.

6. A further "levelling" factor is, or will be the retirement of Nasser Buraik Aulaqi. At the moment of writing (and, it must be noted, this has not yet happened), Nasser Buraik has agreed that if promoted Brigadier on 2 Nov, he will at once go on leave, retiring on 2 Dec. Face will thus have been saved by his having technically been a "serving" Brigadier. This will leave as Commander Designate Mohammed Ahmed Aulaqi, who although an Aulaqi has, insofar as has been possible, avoided politics; he is indeed a good and efficient soldier, and is, I believe, recognised and respected as such by many non-Aulaqis.

7. There being no government, and the balance within the Armed Forces being so equal the unfortunate political utterances and gestures by both factions within the Forces have almost always stemmed from a specific abuse of military facilities (i.e. communications or transport - including aircraft) by the opposition.

8. Apart from having recently been reminded in strong terms by HE of the inherent danger of this sort of "brinkmanship" I think that the senior Arab Officers are still shaken by the events of 20 Jun; and that for this reason they do not wish actually to ignite the powder barrel. The possibility of a recurrence of 20 Jun is, however, in my opinion very real and could easily be triggered off by some fanatical junior Arab officer or even NCO. That British troops should, in these final stages, tread most warily in their dealings with the South Arabian Forces is imperative.

9. Despite the foregoing rather depressing report, given a strong government (of any sort) soon, I am convinced that in true Arab fashion the South Arabian Army could, and would emerge as sound a mercenary force of its type as is possible. During my five years with the force I have seen just how good it can be, it will be a long time before it again approaches a loyalty to a government which overcomes tribal loyalties, although this was beginning to develop. But to those pessimists who write the SAA off as ruined by recent events I would reply that the Arab has a resilience and a realism not generally understood by Westerners. In his own words "عَوْنَانِي تَوْرِي": "If the glass turns, then we turn with it".

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10. Annex C gives some statistical information which may be of general interest. It is regretted that no similar statistics are available in respect of the South Arabian Police.

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Annex A to 8509/BFG dated 11 Nov 67

Page No 1 of 3 pages

SOUTH ARABIAN ARMY

(Please read in conjunction with my Annex B to BFG/CA of 28 Oct 67.)

1. As I finally left the SAA on 8 Nov 67, having spent over five years with the force, I witnessed over the five preceding days events which, at the eleventh hour (and indeed 59 minutes), may well have saved the Army as an entity.

2. I began my previous report by stating that morale was extremely low; I believe it reached its lowest point ever on 5 November, but subsequent events have caused a remarkable improvement, and, from the Army's viewpoint, fairly painlessly. Relevant events, in chronological order, are as follows.

3. On 1 November after months (years even), Aqeed Nasser Buraik Aulaqi was prevailed upon to announce his retirement, having agreed that if given the rank of Zaim (Brigadier) he would go immediately on leave, and would retire (with, of course, Brigadier's gratuity and pension) on 2 December. The occasion was marked by a "Tea Party" in the Arab Officers' Mess attended by all Arab officers (Aulaqi and non-Aulaqi; FLOSY and NLF as well as the few remaining British officers with the SAA).

4. This was a typically Arab farewell party, though the speeches made in conjunction with the various presentations were fairly forthright, and included subject matter not normally voiced on such occasions. Nasser Buraik, for example, replying to the main speech of thanks for his service said ".....I don't think anyone has said enough about my 33 years' service.....I must speak freely; it is only political manipulators who have caused me to resign....I now realise that certain people are accusing me of being involved in politics...."

5. I had taken the precaution of bringing a full South Arabian Broadcasting Service Radio and TV Team to cover this event, not for the purpose of publicising these rather acid speeches (the necessary editing of tapes and films prior to release took several hours) but because I had arranged for the most respected Qadi in Aden, Shaikh Mohammad bin Salem al Beihani, to be present. He is an excellent old man, possibly the only universally respected Qadi in Aden, who has unflinchingly, and of his own volition, always done his utmost to restore peace in the area.

6. This ploy certainly paid dividends. Shaikh Beihani made a long speech in immaculate Arabic culminating in a call for those present of all tribes and of all political factions to come forward and rededicate themselves individually to the cause of a fully independent South Arabia. In true Arab fashion, emotionally ensnared by well spoken and high flown phraseology, the officers surged forward and each one recited after the Qadi a great oath to this effect. This "oath taking ceremony" was seized upon by the international press and by the BBC and was, of course, broadcast "in toto" over local radio. It rather overshadowed the original object of the party, a bonus in itself perhaps.

7. On 2 Nov, Nasser Buraik, appropriately dressed as a Brigadier, was given a farewell parade (Camel Troop, etc..) The parade began at 0800 hours and at 0830 hours he boarded a helicopter which took him to his home in Wadi Yishbun. One wonders whether he will ever be seen again.

8. The following day the NLF/PLCSY fighting started, mainly in the Shaikh Othman/Mansura area. As this has been over-reported in the World Press I will not dwell upon it other than to say that in the four days it lasted it would seem that for once the Press estimate of 100 killed and 300 injured is not an exaggeration.

9. Throughout this period morale within the SAA deteriorated. It is fairly clear that among those soldiers who absented themselves from duty some were involved in

/ the interfactional...

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the interfactional fighting. One of the first casualties in Shaikh Othman was Nasser Buraik's house there. It was totally destroyed by an explosion and one of his sons, a Lance Corporal in the SAA, was found dead in the ruins, having, it is said, been knifed beforehand.

10. Kidnappings were prevalent; a typical example, and one "close to home", was the curious case of the Head of SABS News Bureau, one Abdul Rehman Haideri - a most energetic and efficient man (unique in Aden)- together with two of his staff were taken at gun-point from their office by a young man named Hamati, who has for the past two years been programme director of my Forces Corner. He emerged as the local NLF cell leader. Despite reports of his having been executed, Haideri turned up again two days later. Hamati has now disappeared. Thus, over a vital period, in the shape of Kidnapper and Kidnapped (NLF and FLOSY respectively) both my direct contacts with Aden Radio, civilian news bureau and Forces Corner, were out of action.

11. Having avoided the issue for the first two days of the fighting, the Committee of Colonels, now chaired by the new Commander Designate Mohammad Ahmad Aulaqi, at last decided to show their hand. The excuse used was that a patrol of the SAA came under fire from a FLOSY stronghold; in practice the patrol drove into crossfire NLF/FLOSY and took sides.

12. As I have said in previous reports, the Army consists largely of NLF sympathisers, if not active supporters. This was kept in check by the small percentage of FLOSY sympathisers in key appointments; this is not to say that all the Aulaqis are pro-FLOSY and the non-Aulaqis pro-NLF, but by force of circumstances the inter-necine struggle within the Forces had these labels attached.

13. The immediate outcome of the SAA declaring itself for the NLF rather clarifies the preceding paragraph. Some ten Aulaqi officers, including the AA & MG (one of the first two SAA officers to attend the Staff College course at Camberley), three Battalion Commanders and six other fairly senior majors, resigned instantly. Arrangements were made to give them their gratuities and an aircraft was arranged to take them back to their up-country homes within a matter of hours.

14. These resignations on 7 November without doubt saved, but only just, the total disintegration of the South Arabian Army, which on 5 November appeared a distinct possibility, with soldier firing against soldier.

15. Certainly there will continue to be further pruning of FLOSY supporters within the Army. But this will be done discreetly, and it would seem that the officers as a whole, now that they have clarified the Army's allegiance, wish it to return to correct military status. A small, but I think significant, example indicating this occurred as I walked for the last time out of the Headquarters. An Army vehicle entered the camp full of cheerful soldiers and bearing an enormous NLF flag; it so happened that two Arab officers, a lieutenant colonel and a major both known as ardent NLF men, were passing and both quite spontaneously berated the NCO on the vehicle soundly for having a "political flag on a military vehicle."

16. The future of the present Commander Designate, Mohammad Ahmad Aulaqi MC, will be of interest. Although an Aulaqi, he has kept clear of politics and is generally respected by all as a good and efficient soldier ~~thus~~ his retention may give the Army an outward impression of having some sort of tribal balance and tolerance. *He may, therefore, survive.*

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Annex A Page 3 of 3

17. Although I consider that the South Arabian Army will survive as an entity, it will surely suffer a serious hangover from its political junketings. Not the least problem will be the re-allocation of the many choice and significant appointments now vacant. Doubtless the NLF "Commandos" will demand to be inserted into its fabric with appropriate rank and status.

18. There are, furthermore, entire departments which have collapsed, one of them being the PR Department which I set up in 1962 and under cover of which I carried out most of my work within the SAA. Having on 7 November handed over to two captains, a civilian translator and a broadcaster, I returned on the morning of 8 November to say my final farewells. The office was deserted. The entire staff, including the soldier clerks, had been arrested in the early hours. As predicted ~~the~~ GAMBIA is now dead.

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From Major P.H. BARTLETT RA
(GSO 2 Civil Affairs)

8509/BFG

Colonel H.N.H. WILD OBE
Directorate of Forward Plans
Ministry of Defence
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HQ British Forces Gulf
British Forces Post Office 63

11 November 1967

AUS(Pol) to see.

Dear Colonel,

I am now back in Bahrain, I believe permanently. I had to return for the quarterly Counter Subversion Committee Meeting on 14 November, and with things as they are at the moment I see little merit in returning to Aden after that date.

In order to round off my previous report on the South Arabian Army I enclose a few comments which may be of interest to you. (Two copies marked Ans A)

Thank you very much for the trouble which you have taken to get me on the USA Psy Ops Course; as you now know, Admiral Martin has approved the 8 May to 23 August Course. I am sure that it will be of considerable value.

I return to UK on 3/4 December to talk to the Old Sarum Course on 7 December and I will, of course, report to you in person at that time.

Yours sincerely

- Kit Willmott

P.S. I am copying my report to Psy Op. Wing at Old Sarum just to keep them up to date.

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LOOSE MINUTE

MIDDLE EAST - ADEN

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The attached reports were received by DFP from the psychological representative with the SAA. The reports are only a personal representation of events as he saw them and his assessment but are considered to be of considerable interest.

H. N. H. WILD

(H.N.H. WILD)

Colonel

Deputy Director Forward
Plans

4th July 1967

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17 June 1967

NOTES ON THE SOUTH ARABIAN ARMY
JUNE 1967

Herewith two copies of "Notes on the South Arabian Army - June 1967". Please destroy all issues of "Notes on the Federal Regular Army", which are, of course, now out of date.

P. H. Bartlett

(P.H. BARTLETT)
Major
Information Adviser

Directorate of Forward Plans,
Ministry of Defence, (Main Building),
Whitehall,
LONDON

Notes on the South Arabian Army

June 1967

ROLE

The South Arabian Army has two main tasks; the defence of South Arabia against aggression from outside her borders, and, when so required, action in support of the Civil Authorities to maintain law and order within the country.

HISTORY

The Army came into being in 1 June 1967, with the amalgamation of the two forces hitherto responsible for defence and internal security, the Federal Regular Army and the First Federal Guard respectively.

The origins of the FRA may be traced back as far as the First World War when locally enlisted Arabs were formed into an Infantry Battalion which had its headquarters at Sheikh Othman and furnished garrisons on Perim and Kamaran Islands.

In 1928, when the Royal Air Force became responsible for the protection of Aden and the adjacent hinterland, the Infantry Battalion which had been disbanded in 1925, was reformed as the Aden Protectorate Levies.

Lieutenant Colonel Lake, of the Indian Army, who had previously commanded the Infantry Battalion, was recalled to raise and command this Force, which was employed on the protection of airfields, Residency Guards and again provided garrisons for Perim and Kamaran. In 1929 the Camel Troop was formed.

Until 1939, the force remained relatively unchanged, carrying out guard, garrison and ceremonial duties, but with the outbreak of the Second World War an Anti-Aircraft Wing was formed within the Aden Protectorate Levies, who then became solely responsible for the protection of Aden's airfields against attacks from both ground and air. Shortly after Italy's entry into the war in 1940, the newly formed Anti-Aircraft Wing scored its first success with the destruction of an Italian bomber over Isthmus.

In the post war years the calls upon the Levies to carry out military action in the Western Aden Protectorate increased considerably and in 1957 the Force became the responsibility of the British Army, whereupon it was reorganised on orthodox lines.

In 1961, the Aden Protectorate Levies were handed over to the Federal Government, and were redesignated the Federal Regular Army. In 1964, the Federal Government assumed full operational and financial control.

The Federal Guard came into being in 1938, as the result of a suggestion by Major Seager, a Political Officer, to the effect that a Frontier Force should be formed approximately 100 strong. This Frontier Force was to be available for
/maintaining

maintaining security in the neighbourhood of the Frontier and it was suggested that they should be known as "Government Guards", and that Captain the Hon R.A.B. Hamilton, another Political Officer, (he later became Lord Belhaven and Stenton), should be given command and should be responsible for the raising, organisation and training of the proposed unit. By March 1938 approval had been received from the Secretary of State and work started at Sheikh Othman, where Captain Hamilton set up his headquarters.

By 1953 the Government Guards had reached a strength of over 500 men. They were dispersed in numerous posts throughout the Western Aden Protectorate with their headquarters and a small reserve at Khormaksar in Aden Colony, and were commanded by a permanent Commandant who had four British and fourteen Arab officers to help him in this task.

In 1959 the Government Guards were handed over to the Federal Government and were renamed the Federal Guard. At the same time the old Tribal Guards, maintained by the rulers from subsidies provided by the British, and with who they had an even closer connection, were incorporated in the Federal Guard as Federal Guard II. They were intended to operate as a rural police force, and as such could not be employed outside the boundaries of their states, whereas Federal Guard I was a country-wide gendarmerie under the direct control of the Federal Minister for Internal Security. Neither force was organised along police lines but was largely military, equipped with rifles, Bren guns and mortars. The ranks of officers and NCOs were the same as in the FRA, pay and conditions of service were more or less equated, and recruitment was from the same tribes, and often from the same families.

ORGANISATION

The South Arabian Army is controlled by the Ministry of Defence which is, of course, responsible in turn to the Supreme Council, from which certain Ministers form the National Defence and Security Council which deals with the more detailed military aspects of the Supreme Council's work.

At the Army's Headquarters in Aden is located the South Arabian Joint Operations Centre which is manned by Staff Officers twenty four hours a day, and is in direct radio contact with the up country Area Headquarters.

Between them, these Area Headquarters cover the whole of South Arabia, and have units of the Army under their command in appropriately sited garrison areas.

The nature of the Army's tasks, coupled with its wide-spread deployment in battalion garrisons throughout South Arabia, makes three particular demands of the organisation.

/Firstly,

Firstly, in order to maintain efficient command and control, communications within the force must be of the highest order. The Signal Regiment maintains daily 24 hour contact between the Headquarters, Area Headquarters and all up country garrisons and troops operating anywhere in the Federation.

Secondly, bearing in mind the appalling terrain which separates these battalions from their Headquarters, the maintenance of equipment and supplies, both operational and routine, necessitates a closely coordinated and extremely flexible system for their provision and transportation. This is achieved by the balanced use of military transport aircraft (including helicopters) and military vehicle convoys for the movement of operational and warlike stores, and civilian charter aircraft and vehicles for the lifting of routine supplies.

Thirdly, the urgent operational movement of units from their garrison location to a particular trouble spot at minimal notice. This entails the highest possible degree of planning and cooperation at every level, and, by virtue of considerable practice over the past years, all the battalions have become adept at every conceivable method of re-deployment, be it the movement of vehicles by transport aircraft, tactical moves by sub units, including descent by ropes from helicopters, or lifting of mortars over otherwise inaccessible terrain on camel back.

The backbone of the Army is, of course, its fighting battalions, whose soldiers armed with rifles, and light machine guns, must number amongst the world's most agile and best trained mountain troops, specialising in patrolling, ambush and picquetting operations.

Each battalion has its own support weapons, which include mortars, medium machine guns, anti-tank weapons and a light anti-aircraft troop equipped with heavy machine guns.

The South Arabian Army's Armoured Car Squadrons, equipped with Saladin Armoured Cars and Ferret Scout Cars, are responsible for patrolling the vast tracts of land which lie beyond the range of the garrisons' normal sphere of influence, and for the escorting of convoys through potentially hostile territory.

Medical support exists in the form of a pool of doctors who give full time cover to operational battalions, and are available at short notice to escort casualties evacuated by air. The Hospital at Khormaksar Beach, staffed by British Service doctors, assisted by Arab administrative staff and medical orderlies, attends not only sick soldiers, but also their entitled dependents.

RECRUITMENT, TRAINING AND PROMOTION

There is never any shortage of volunteers for recruitment into the South Arabian Army. This is indicative not only of the high regard in which the Force is held throughout the country, but also of the fact that it can be extremely

/selective

selective in its choice of recruits.

Apart from maintenance of an overall balance within the Force, recruiting, and indeed subsequent training and posting, is carried out without regard to tribal affiliation. The results of this policy, together with the Force's operational successes, has seen the emergence of a new loyalty to the South Arabian Army, (and hence to the Federation), which is daily becoming stronger, yet without impinging upon the soldiers' innate tribal loyalties.

The Training Battalion at Lake Lines is responsible for most of the training in the Force. Besides recruit training, courses are run for specialists such as mortar and machine gun detachments, for NCOs and potential officers, as well as officers' promotion courses.

Education within the South Arabian Army is given a very high priority. The Education Centre, in addition to the provision of instructors with each battalion, runs an Apprentices' School to ensure a steady flow of potential leaders, technicians and clerks for the Force. There is also a Boys' School and a Girls' School for the children of serving soldiers.

Each year a number of specially selected officers and NCOs attend courses in the United Kingdom and elsewhere abroad, so that the Army is kept constantly in touch with the latest equipment and techniques. Several Arab officers who have recently taken up senior Staff appointments have successfully completed courses at Camberley and in Jordan.

The high morale which exists throughout the Army may doubtless be attributed in no small measure to the attention which is paid to the welfare of the soldier and his dependants. Apart from a basic rate of pay which compares most favourably with any other Arab army, there is a pension scheme, and, on a voluntary basis, a Widows Fund.

THE FUTURE

In recent years, great advances have been made towards Arabisation. With the promise of Independence by 1968, this has been speeded up and continues to progress according to a carefully planned programme.

The Army still has a British Commander (Brigadier) but his deputy is an Arab Colonel, and five other Arab officers also hold this rank. Arab officers command all the operational and training units and most of the administrative units. At the time of writing, there are less than 50 British officers and 150 British NCOs seconded to the Army, largely in technical and advisory appointments. After Independence there will remain a requirement for a small number of expatriate personnel on contract to fulfil some of these tasks.

REORGANISATION AND EXPANSION OF THE ARMY

Independence by 1968 with the implicit withdrawal of the British Base and the ending of all Defence Treaties with Britain necessitated urgent and detailed planning to rectify the imbalance within the Army which had, hitherto depended upon British Forces for its artillery support, operational and, to a lesser extent, logistic air support as well as for the provision of certain supplementary armoured and infantry units.

The Army's minimal additional requirements were studied and found to be several additional infantry battalions; and artillery unit, where none had existed before; the formation of a heavy armoured car unit to supplement the existing Scout Car Squadron; a proportionate increase in staff and training organisations, and the formation of an engineer element.

To enable this expansion to be carried out the British Government have made a grant of £5.5 million to cover capital costs and have agreed that the sum of £10.25 million will be granted annually for three years after Independence towards maintenance costs of the South Arabian Forces. In both instances, these sums are to cover all arms.

All but one of the additional infantry battalions has been formed by the re-training of former First Federal Guard Katibas (Battalions). These Katibas, whose former role as an Internal Security Force required them to function more as a form of gendarmerie than as soldiers, have proved enthusiastic and adept in assuming their new role. The additional battalion will be formed by special recruitment and transfer of selected personnel within the Army.

An artillery unit has already been formed and trained; equipped with the robust, well-proven British 25 pounder, it became operational in May 1967.

The additional armoured car unit has been equipped with Saladin Armoured Cars. Personnel to man them have already been selected and trained and will shortly take over from British units similarly equipped.

The reorganisation and expansion of the Army, in addition to increasing its numerical strength by over 70% all ranks, also includes the replacement of obsolescent equipment formerly in service, typical examples of this are the introduction of the 84mm Karl Gustav anti-tank weapon and the 81mm mortar to replace the former RCL weapon and 3" mortar respectively.

OTHER ARMS OF THE SOUTH ARABIAN DEFENCE FORCES

Although these notes are concerned primarily with the South Arabian Army, the following information about the future air force and the navy, both of which will operate under the Defence Ministry, may be of interest.

/South Arabian

South Arabian Air Force. This will consist of a number of BAC 167 jet aircraft with the capability of carrying rockets, cannon or machine guns, DC 3 transports, Beaver aircraft and Sioux helicopters for OP and liaison duties.

In the first instance the Commander and pilots will be expatriate civilians on contract to the South Arabian Government. These will be replaced gradually by Arabs of whom a number have already been selected for training. Servicing and ground maintenance of aircraft has been undertaken by a civilian organisation under contract.

South Arabian Navy. Concerned primarily with anti-smuggling and fishery protection duties, this will be a small force equipped with three specially converted inshore minesweepers.

CONCLUSION

On the attainment of Independence by South Arabia, the Armed Forces will be in a position to prevent limited Frontier incursions; to deal with tribal disputes and to maintain Internal Security. The reorganisation and expansion has, however, been based on a minimal requirement for these purposes.

To ensure the defence of South Arabia against full scale aggression clearly demands the support of either UN Forces or an appropriate Treaty with a friendly power. Whilst extremely capable of giving a good account of itself against any form of attack, the South Arabian Army, like the army of any emergent territory, must have this ultimate assurance.

From: Major P.H. Bartlett, RA

~~SECRET~~

30

Information Services
Headquarters South Arabian Army
British Forces Post Office 69

105 PR

26 June 1967

Personal for:
Colonel H.N.H. Wild, OBE
Directorate of Forward Plans
Ministry of Defence
Whitehall
London SW 1

W

DIRECTORATE OF FORWARD PLANS	
DATE	3 JUL 1967
SEEN BY	INTLS
DIRECTOR	
DEPUTY DIRECTOR	
"Z"	R.N.
SECTION	R.A.F.
CLERK	
FILE	

Dear Colonel,

After the unfortunate coincidence of signing off my report to you on morale in the South Arabian Army at the exact moment when things came to a head, I felt that I should follow it up with some details of what actually happened on 20 June.

As regards an assessment of the long term effects of this disastrous day, it is as yet, far too early to do other than say that the conclusions drawn in my Paper of the 20 June are still valid.

The appalling reporting on the situation by the BBC and World Press did the South Arabian Army a great disservice. It was due to:

a. Conflict between the Federal Government and the High Commission policy regarding release of information. In the early stages there was no High Commission direction (Tony Ashworth was, unfortunately, in Beihan) and Federal Policy was to minimise the whole affair and at all costs not to reveal the suspension of the four Colonels. I was in close personal touch with General Philip Tower over this, and he instructed MEC to conform. Without reference to Federal MOD or HQ SAA the Deputy High Commissioner on personal instructions of HE, held a Press Conference in the evening (Tony, unfortunately had still not returned) in which he made a clean breast of the whole issue, and in considerable detail. This, as you will appreciate, produced the worst possible confusion amongst the Press, who, initially deprived of fact, began reporting rumour, upon which, too late, was superimposed the truth.

b. BBC Aden Correspondent was away in Kuwait. Not only is he (Brazier) a staunch ally, but BBC London would have had one single responsible source rather than selecting the nastiest items from several less reputable agencies.

c. Press representatives in Aden did not take the trouble to inform themselves on the reorganisation and redesignation of the various South Arabian Forces.

However, despite all this and Cairo's allegation that the trouble was because of dissatisfaction with Mr George Brown's statement on South Arabia, I am quite certain that this was not the case and was merely another unfortunate coincidence upon which the NLF were quick to seize.

Certainly the proposals regarding aid for South Arabia, and in particular military aid, were generally well received by the Federal Ministers. The final additional spoonful of sugar in the form of self loading rifles and Hunter aircraft has proved an extremely shrewd and worthwhile gesture.

Because of the events of last Tuesday it is quite impossible to assess what the SAA officers think of the extra military aid; they are, as yet, all too busy watching one another.

I am copying this
to Colonel Clements.

Yours sincerely,
P.H. Bartlett

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DISTURBANCES WITHIN THE SOUTH ARABIAN FORCES 20 JUNE 1967

8P

INTRODUCTION

1. The aim of this Paper is to explain the causes of these disturbances and to detail the sequence of events. It is, as yet, far too early to draw any proper conclusions as to the effect this episode will have on the future.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

17 - 19 June

2. The "shot gun wedding" between the former FRA and Federal Guard I brought with it a number of problems concerned largely with tribal rivalries and seniorities.

3. These came to a head only 16 days after the formation of the SAA, when, on 17 June twelve senior officers (four Aqeeds (Colonels) and eight Qaids (Lt Col)) of the total of 20 holding these two ranks in the force, signed a petition alleging various injustices concerning promotions, appointments, policy etc.

4. This document was extremely badly phrased, and was not only near-libellous, but copies were also despatched direct to the High Commissioner, C in C, individual Ministers of the South Arabian Government as well as to the Minister of Defence.

5. The signatories were 10 non-Aulaqis and two "dissident" Aulaqis, the senior officer to sign being Aqeed Sharif Haider, a cousin of the Ruler of Beihan, who was, prior to the merger of FRA and FG, the senior Arab Officer of the latter force.

6. Commander SAA considered that disciplinary action should be taken, the nature of which would have to be decided by the Supreme Council (Cabinet), to whom he recommended that until their decision was reached the senior signatory should be suspended from duty. It was, he felt, impracticable to suspend all twelve.

7. Because of the personal status of Aqeed Sharif Haider (whose uncle the Sharif of Beihan is Minister of the Interior) the Supreme Council settled on a compromise, and Commander SAA was instructed that all four of the Aqeeds who signed should be suspended from duty. This being an Arab Army they were, for public consumption, "sent on leave", this on 18 June.

8. 19 June was an Arab Public Holiday hence no reaction within the force was visible. It transpires, however, that this period was put to good use in that a lot of planning must have been carried out.

9. On the evening of 19 June there was one premature incident when an Aulaqi subaltern who was Orderly Officer at a Field Training Camp was threatened by the other officers who demanded, at pistol point, the armoury keys. He succeeded in escaping and reported this incident.

20 June

10. Early morning brought rumours of a "go-slow" in Lake Lines which is near Sheikh Othman, some 5 miles from Aden, and accommodates the SAA Training Battalion, Education Wing, Apprentices' School, and MT Company.

11. By 0800 hours fighting broke out amongst SAA Apprentices but this was restricted to fisticuffs and stone throwing and SAA soldiers took sides and joined in. Some prisoners were released but attempts to seize the armoury were foiled. By 0930 hours the situation was such that the use of British troops was considered but, happily, was rejected; at 1000 hours the situation was brought under control by Arab officers of the SAA. Total damage being innumerable broken windows and one barrack room burnt.

12. At 0900 hours in Champion Lines, the Headquarters and Depot of the South

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Arabian Police (formerly Federal Guard II), which lies approximately midway between Lahej and Aden, far more serious trouble broke out.

13. These Police Barracks contained some 600 Arab all ranks and 6 British officers, with two British female typists. Again the trouble started with supporters of the two factions (Aulaqi/non-Aulaqi) fighting with one another, but here it was carried out with small arms, and the small camp armoury was seized and broken into.

14. The women were evacuated but because of the danger of the very large armoury which exists also in this Camp falling into the rioters' hands, the Ministry of Internal Security asked for British Military assistance.

15. At this juncture the nature of the disturbances changed. The arrival of British troops at the Barrack gates united the rioters against this new threat. NLF rapidly exploited the situation, inciting the mob to greater efforts over the mosque tannoy.

16. It was during this period that the RCT Range Party, who were in a lorry returning from using the Rifle Range adjacent to Champion Lines, came under LMG fire, were pinned down in the open and received vicious bursts of fire from Police LMGs whenever no other target was available. Eight soldiers were found dead in the vehicle afterwards, and an officer of the IS Company was also killed in the Camp entrance battle. A British civilian passing by in his car was also killed.

17. At Al Ittihad, the Federal Capital, some 11 miles away unrest spread amongst the South Arabian Police (former FG 2), guarding the Government and Secretariat Buildings.

18. All sentries deserted their posts and converged on the main building. I was just driving away from a meeting there in my private car, and met the front gate guard sprinting towards me; judging this to be a rather unusual procedure I drove through their ranks waving cheerfully. Some shouted abuse and waved their rifles, but at least two saluted smartly. This was at about 1130 hours, and I was the last car to get out until 1400 hours as all occupants of the Main Building were locked in their offices whilst South Arabian Policemen ran amok breaking windows; some removed the flag from the roof.

19. Whilst this was going on, Ministers and Permanent Secretaries were, locked in their offices, dealing by telephone with the serious situation in Champion Lines. The Minister of Defence ordered the "recall from leave" of two of the Aqeads, and instructed them to go to the Police Barracks and restore order.

20. The South Arabian Police Officers at Al Ittihad restored order by detailing off their men to go out and "defend the perimeter" (against whom was not specified). This they did, and after cooling off in sandy defensive positions for several hours (at 101°F) the policemen decided to return to their normal duties.

21. At 1400 hours the two released Aqeads approached and entered Champion Lines, and within a very short period all firing had ceased and order was restored.

22. At 1500 hours a message was received in the SAA Ops Room that about 100 SAA soldiers of the Battalion stationed nearest to Aden (some 40 miles North at Al Anad) had left without orders in two lorries and two land rovers with MMGs bound for Aden.

23. As this party passed through Lahej they were joined by a similar number of South Arabian Police and drove on their way pursued, rather forlornly, by a vehicle full of officers trying vainly to get them to return.

24. Commander SAA then ordered the other two Aqeads to go out and meet this party which they did, and with little trouble succeeded in getting them to turn about and go back to Al Anad.

25. Concurrent rioting which broke out in Crater during the day which involved insurrection amongst the Armed Police, and the sustaining of heavy casualties (8 killed, several missing and many wounded) to the British Security Forces, cannot be connected directly with the other disturbances. I suspect that as in the Champion Lines incident, adroit use of rumour and exaggeration about the British having "arrested four senior Arab officers" was made by NLF.

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By 1800 hours the situation was back to normal. Troops of several up country garrisons who had refused to hand in their arms after training had now also done so, and a quiet night followed.

21 June

- 27. All four of the suspended Aqeads returned to duty and reassumed their respective appointments and commands.
- 28. I am quite certain that the disturbances mentioned were neither sparked off by nor directly connected with Mr George Brown's announcement concerning South Arabia's Independence date.

From: Major P.H. Bartlett, RA

UK EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

29

Information Services
Headquarters South Arabian Army
British Forces Post Office 69

5105 PR

20 June 1967

Personal for:

Colonel H.N.H. Wild, OBE
Directorate of Forward Plans
Ministry of Defence
Whitehall
London S.W.1

DIRECTORATE OF FORWARD PLANS	
DATE	
SEEN BY	INTLS
DIRECTOR	
DEPUTY DIRECTOR	
"Z"	R.A.
SECTION	ARMY
	R.A.F.
CLERK	
FILE	257/3

John Wild
Army
Army

Dear Colonel

I thought that the present stirring times in the Middle East might be an appropriate moment to send you some sort of appraisal of the newly formed South Arabian Army.

I must emphasise that the attached paper represents only my own personal views, based on almost five years with the FRA. Whilst thereby claiming to have my ear fairly close to the ground, I would immediately qualify each and every word written with General James Lunt's remark: ".... whoever considers himself an expert on South Arabian affairs has been misinformed".

I am copying this to Colonel John Clements only.

Yours sincerely

Peter Bartlett

P.S. As I sign this I learn that disturbances have broken out in our Training Battalion Camp. They appear serious, but I will, nevertheless post this and send you a reassessment later if necessary.

SECRETThe Impact of Recent Events in the Middle East on
the South Arabian Army

27A

AIM

1. The aim of this Paper is to adduce the psychological impact of the recent Arab - Israeli war together with certain other internal concurrent events on morale and stability of the South Arabian Army.

FACTORS

2. Apart from the war itself and its aftermath two other factors are relevant to this issue, largely because they occurred almost simultaneously with the war itself. They are:

a. The formation, on 1 June 1967, of the South Arabian Army, which was, in effect the merging of two forces, the Federal Regular Army and the First Federal Guard, between whom long standing rivalries have always existed.

b. The Supreme Council decision, some two weeks earlier, that Aqeed Nasser Buraik Aulaqi should become, eventually, the first Arab Commander of the South Arabian Army. This against all British Military and Political advice and bringing with it another series of seniority problems within the Army's upper echelons, partly connected with 2.a. above.

3. It will therefore be appreciated that the effects of the Israeli war cannot, on account of these other concurrent events, be dealt with in isolation.

THE WAR - SEQUENCE OF EVENTS1. June - 5 June 67

4. The first outward and visible sign of the Federal Government's intention of involvement, albeit only vocal, in the then Arab - Israeli confrontation, came in a speech made by the Minister for External Affairs, Sheikh Mohammed Farid al Aulaqi in his capacity as current Chairman of the Supreme Council, at the inaugural parade of the SAA.

5. The occasion was graced by three speeches; the Ministers of Internal Security and Defence both adhered to their prepared scripts. Mohammed Farid, however, who had been until the previous day out of the country and returned unexpectedly, insisted not only on attending the parade, as of course was right and proper, but also on making what he termed a "Political Speech".

6. Copies of this speech for translation and circulation were suspiciously late in becoming available; the content, however, was not unreasonable and included an appropriate topical placebo declaring South Arabia's support for Arab Unity against the common enemy.

7. The Minister did not, alas, adhere to his script, and to loud applause not only from SAA recruits watching the parade, but also from many senior British officers who understood not one word, he declared South Arabia's total support for the UAR which, under the inspired leadership of Jamal Abdul Nasser, was about to crush Israel.

8. Thus was the "band-wagon" first sighted in South Arabia. To every Minister, to every officer and soldier of the South Arabian Forces, to every civil servant, here, from the highest level was authority for each one to take out an insurance policy against post Independence unknowns.

9. The floodgates were thus opened. Battalion Commanders vied with one another in the despatch of signals emphasising their loyalty to the Pan-Arab Cause against Israel. One Area Headquarters announced its readiness to move at once to Egypt. Another Battalion Commander donated one month's pay from his unit towards the cause (this, incidentally, without prior reference to his soldiers).

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UK EYES ONLY

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his vociferous support was, with minor exceptions, contained within the Army, although one unit did copy its loyal message direct to the South Arabian Broadcasting Service which was inevitably and, I consider, correctly given free rein over this period.

11. Thus, whilst in addition to the public purchase of post Independence insurance by every senior civilian in South Arabia, the smaller fry indulged in an orgy of strikes, demonstrations, Jew-baiting and looting, the South Arabian Army generally retained an external aspect of military rectitude. If, that is, one overlooks minor oversights such as SAA lorries bearing a UAR flag, of which two instances are known.

5 June - 7 June 67

12. The actual outbreak of hostilities was marked by intense excitement throughout the Force. Every soldier had a transistor radio pressed permanently to his ear, and officers pored over maps of Israel.

13. Initially the radiolistener-pattern was normal, that is about 85% adhering solely to Cairo, Taiz and San'a, reverting to the South Arabian Broadcasting Service only for such items as affected them personally ("Forces Corner" etc), the remainder listening to BBC World Service and SABS; the IQ of the listeners being in roughly inverse proportion to the percentages quoted. This pattern has remained fairly constant over the past three years, with the individual intelligent selective listeners choosing BBC/SABS and mass listeners Cairo, San'a and Taiz.

14. As the news of Arab reversals came in, quite a large number of Arab officers who were traditionally BBC listeners, overtly at any rate, turned to Cairo for what they wanted to hear. I suspect, however, that this was merely a superficial gesture of frustration, and that many of them continued clandestinely to listen to London.

15. One incident, which perhaps indicates the air of hysteria which permeated the higher Arab echelons at this time concerns the 91 SAA students on courses in Jordan. With the closure of Jordan's military schools a request impossible to execute because of cancellation of civil air flights, that all students be evacuated, came to the attention of the Defence Minister at exactly the moment when he was being badgered by the Supreme Council to recruit volunteers for Palestine. A certain expatriate Federal Civil Servant present at the time suggested, one hopes in jest, that to kill two birds with one stone the students in Jordan be offered in toto as a token SAA contingent. Happily for all, Hussein accepted the cease fire before this dreadful plan, accepted as an excellent idea by our Minister, could be put into operation.

7 June to the Present

16. By degrees the realisation of the Arabs' total military defeat by Israel has now, to a greater or lesser extent seeped through to all ranks.

17. It is, of course, impossible to tabulate reaction in detail, but the following may help to give a "broad brush" guide, let (1) be the 15% intelligentsia and (2) be the remainder (equating almost exactly with officers/ORs or BBC/Cairo listeners).

a. Arab Military Defeat.

- (1) Now appreciated in full, but not admitted in public.
- (2) An awareness that something has gone seriously wrong.

b. British/US Collusion.

- (1) Considerable doubts, indeed a distinct possibility, "Suez" is ever on their lips.
- (2) Almost universally accepted as fact.

c. Nasser's "Resignation" Trick.

- (1) Appreciated (in private) for exactly what it was, but its brilliant

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execution has given Nasser additional Kudos.

(2) Accepted as a genuine offer, and the emotion laden "recall" to power has, to an incredible extent, obliterated the military defeat.

d. Let-down of Arabs by USSR.

(1) Felt very strongly.

(2) Not understood (i.e. too complicated).

18. The sum total of all this is that all ranks of the SAA are, at the present sad, puzzled and frustrated. Correctly Arab and British personnel within the SAA have been directed by their respective masters that the subject of Israel is not for mutual discussion.

OTHER CONCURRENT FACTORS

19. Agreed Nasser Buraik Aulagi's succession as Commander SAA confirmed. Although for many and doubtless excellent reasons this officer's succession as Commander SAA has been strongly opposed over the past 3 years or more, the opposition being based on advice from three successive British Commanders, supported by the High Commissioner and C in C, the battle is now over. By an adroit piece of sleight of hand the Federal Supreme Council have confirmed his appointment. True, he has never commanded a Battalion; true, also, his ways are devious. He is, however, a strong man within the Army, and what any Arab needs is a strong man to follow, he need not be popular, but he must be a known person suitable as a figurehead. This, the SAA now has. The long drawnout struggle to depose him has failed.

20. The Arabs are adaptable over this sort of thing, and one of the most unfortunate by-products of the whole affair is that whilst almost all the Arab Officers who were backing the wrong horse are now quite cheerfully readjusted as Nasser Buraik's men, many British officers (seconded and MEC) who have never been more than casual spectators, with little real knowledge of the case, have acquired a fixation about the idea of "that man" as future Commander SAA.

21. The above is merely background material. What is germane to the issue under consideration is that, by coincidence, Brigadier Dye was on leave during the crucial period 1 - 15 June. Thus Nasser Buraik had his first experience of Acting Commander SAA during a very tense period.

22. He did extremely well. Even some of his strongest critics concede this. He accepted the advice of his staff, which, tempered with his experience in the Force he acted upon. As regards political problems such as the huge enthusiasm already referred to for sending volunteers, donations, goodwill messages and the like to those doing battle with Israel he was able, being himself an Arab, to issue firm directives to curb and channel this enthusiasm which a British Commander could not have done to the same effect.

23. As already stated (vide paragraph 2 above), the 1 June SAA Day Parade found several senior Arab Officers in a state of irritation derived not entirely from the new uniforms in which they were appearing for the first time. Not only did (and still do) many of the former Federal Guard Officers have a sneaking suspicion that this was not so much to celebrate a merger as the culmination of a successful FRA take-over bid, but carefully nurtured seniorities were at this moment being in many cases severely jeopardised.

24. The source of FRA/FG rivalries should, perhaps be here explained. The FRA, formerly the APL, has always been an army, all promotion from the ranks being based, broadly speaking, on personal merit. The Federal Guard, formerly the Government Guard, was an Internal Security gendarmerie, and officers were in the past usually selected deliberately because they were related to Sheikly families, and hence were to some extent "hostages". The merging of the two Forces presents certain problems of a nature not entirely unknown in the British Army, but here exacerbated by tribal jealousies and "face".

25. Whilst the FRA had a full-blown, and efficient Records Office, the FG had no such thing, thus "seniority" in the new SAA force, is a word to be used with the utmost circumspection.

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There are, in the SAA, six Aqeeds (full Colonels). The original struggle for power in the FRA was between Nasser Buraik and Mohammed Ahmed (both Aulaqis). This problem, as stated, has been solved by Supreme Council (Cabinet) decree, and Mohammed Ahmed became "Deputy Commander (Designate)". So far so good. Now add to the mixture two former Federal Guard Aqeeds, one of whom is technically senior to Mohammed Ahmed, and yet another problem arises. The Supreme Council having abandoned promotion by merit in favour of promotion by strict seniority have created a very difficult precedent.

27. Whilst the seniority of Aqeeds will, it seems, be always decided by the Supreme Council, imagine this problem all the way down the scale, even including non-commissioned ranks, which must be decided within the SAA and with inadequate records and you see the beginnings of a perpetual running sore.

28. The possibility of an "Aulaqi take-over" looms large in the minds of many since the formation of the SAA. The facts which give rise to this alarm are that the SAA now has:

a. 6 Aqeeds (Colonels) including two Aulaqis (one of whom is Deputy Commander of the Force).

b. ~~14~~²⁰ Qaids (Lt Cols), of these 7 out of 10 Battalion Commanders are Aulaqis, as is the AA&QMG.

i.e. a total of 10 out of ~~14~~²⁰ of the rank of Lt Col and above are Aulaqis, all of whom are in key appointments.

CONCLUSION

29. To sum up, events since 1 June have, I fear weakened the morale of this new-born Army, the three prime factors being:

a. Depression and frustration amongst all ranks by the Arab military defeat by Israel.

b. The necessity for introspection by individuals of all ranks because of the FRA/FG merger.

c. To a far much lesser extent, the volte face necessitated in the case of a number of officers by Nasser Buraik's nomination as first Commander SAA.

30. None of these has, so far, had any visibly deleterious effect upon the fighting capabilities of the South Arabian Army. Indeed, the period under review has seen several very minor, but successful actions.

31. The total effect is that the morale of the Army as a whole has been lowered. Both FRA and FG were, in essence, mercenary forces, but were beginning to show signs of developing a true loyalty to the Federation. This, I fear has, because of the events discussed above, been retarded, and they have to a great extent reverted to their mercenary status.

32. The South Arabian Army should now be considered as a force of "loyal mercenaries", with the priorities of individuals serving therein being:

a. Self-preservation/self-betterment.

b. Tribal loyalty.

c. Preservation of the Army which is, at present, their best available source of material welfare.

d. Loyalty to South Arabia.

The juxtaposition of b. and c. should be carefully noted.

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SECRET

Category AC: no unclassified reply or reference

3699

SECRET

From: MELF
To: MOD Army

IMMEDIATE

RTT 5

For DMO from GOC.

Subject Nasser Buraik.

My RTT/11 of 041045 refers.

1. I have now had a meeting with Dye who has made the following points in addition to those listed in High Commission telegram 492 of 4 May.

- a. Buraik is not a strong personality although he gives a first impression of strength, for example he is not prepared to issue unpopular orders.
- b. He is not respected by the majority of officers because of his old fashioned obsession with tribal rule and his unbalanced loyalty to the Sultans.
- c. His knowledge of G and Q matters is wholly inadequate for Army command.
- d. He is a manipulator with strong Aulaqi Bias. As soon as his appointment is confirmed it is probable that he will try to manipulate Army posts to his advantage. He already has many enemies and the number will increase.

2. I wholly support Dye's opinion and consider his position may easily become impossible since inter factional difficulties may start up in the Army with far reaching effects as soon as the appointment is published or leaked.

3. Although Dye has agreed to continue in command his position must still be safeguarded by the terms of my RTT 22 of 032134 Dec. In particular he must be able to withdraw without the need to provide indisputable proof is he considers Buraik is making command intolerable.

4. If we were to withdraw and inter factional troubles in the FRA became apparent it may prove difficult to hand over internal security in Aden state over a period in the progressive way we have planned to. We may be forced to retain complete control until the last possible moment with consequential effects on stability after independence and on our withdrawal plan since we may have to retain strong forces until late in the day. We may also have to withdraw British personnel well before independence to ensure their safety.

5. I am sending this signal so that you may be in no doubt as to the possible effects resulting from this appointment and to clarify Dye's position. I hope some time will elapse before the decision is announced and this will help to some extent. I have discussed this message with the High Commissioner.

Copy to DOC (061335Z) in view
of MIDCOS 75 (061022Z) from
CINC Mideast (for info)

060846Z

Advance copy to GSDO sent at
060945Z

/Distribution.....

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

MO 4 (AD)

CDS (6)

CNS (4)

CGS (4)

CAS (4)

AUS (Pol)

DS 11

Room 9, Foreign Office (4)

Maj Gen McNeill, FO (3)

DOC (9)

DMO/AD Action

AM.

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SECRET

PERSONAL FOR

FILE 257/3.

From: Lt Col R.S. Richmond, MC, RA
Gd 1 (Civil Affairs)



(24)

Headquarters
Middle East Command
British Forces Post Office 69

2561/2/CA

22 April 1967

Colonel H.N.H. Wild, OBE
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall
London S.W. 1

Amrits
Dear Colonel,

az

Thank you for your letter of 11th April 1967. Current opinion regarding the future varies according to whether a person is a Federali or a pro-terrorist but on one point they are unanimous and that is the U.N. Mission. They - all of them - never want to see it again. FLOSY and NLF never wanted it in any case and refused to speak to it and the Mission refused to speak to the Federal Government; so it was not surprising that it achieved nothing. They really were a useless bunch.

FLOSY supporters hailed the Mission's departure as a great victory and said that it had effectively proved that FLOSY was the sole legal authority and the only force which, when it issued a direction or made an appeal, was unanimously obeyed. Makkawi is as intransigent as ever and decries any fresh move as an imperialist manoeuvre, e.g. after having said that FLOSY would only negotiate with the British Government he then denounced the visit of Lord Shackleton, a British Government Minister, as another British plot. I get the impression that FLOSY reckons it is now so much on top that it can call the tune.

In spite of this it is important not to lose sight of two facts. First that this is only FLOSY's opinion of itself and secondly that, although with the full backing of the Egyptian propaganda machine it is the most vociferous organization, its claim to be representative of all, or even a majority, of the people is just not true. Were free elections to be held FLOSY no doubt would get many seats in Aden but likewise many of the sultans and shaikhs would be elected in their states.

Meanwhile the Federalis are going it alone, "hampered by your British methods of administration and unwillingness to give us real power and authority", as one minister put it. Although they would not like it they would be prepared to accept a broadening of the Government to include "nationalist" representatives but they certainly will not accept that FLOSY represents the majority of the people - and they are right. Therefore they feel that the British, if they must, can negotiate with the "nationalists" to participate in the Government but that, if the approach fails, the British Government should then cut adrift finally from the terrorists and from Nasser, back the Federalis to the hilt and not leave them until they are strong enough to cope by themselves.

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To summarize the Federali attitude: "We will tolerate an approach to the "nationalists" to ask them to see reason and to participate in a broader-based Federal Government. If they refuse then let them try to seize the Government (as Makkawi has threatened) and we will see who wins (but we naturally - and reasonably - expect to be given strong support)."

In the absence of free elections this is the time- honoured method of deciding who should rule a country. Our obligation, I feel, is to give these chaps who are brave enough to participate in the Federal Government, both now and after we leave, the support they deserve for being unfashionable enough to be associated with the British.

*Yours ever
J. H. Dunn*

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19 April 1967

Directorate of Forward Plans,
Ministry of Defence (New Building)
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NOTES ON THE FEDERAL REGULAR ARMY
(APRIL 1967 REVISE)

Herewith ~~two~~ copies of the April 1967 revise of "Notes on the Federal Regular Army". Please destroy all previous issues, including the November 1966 revise.

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P. H. Bartlett
(P.H. BARTLETT)
Major
Information Adviser to
Federal Ministry of Defence

DIRECTORATE OF FORWARD PLANS	
DATE 24 APR 1967	
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DEPUTY DIRECTOR <u>John H. G.</u>	
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Notes on the Federal Regular Army
(April 1967 Revise)

ROLE

The Army of the Federation of South Arabia has at present two main roles; the defence of the Federation against any outside aggression and, when so required, action in support of the Civil Authorities to maintain law and order within the Federation.

HISTORY

The origins of the force may be traced back as far as the First World War when locally enlisted Arabs were formed into an Infantry Battalion which had its headquarters at Sheikh Othman and furnished garrisons on Perim and Kamaran Islands.

In 1928, when the Royal Air Force became responsible for the protection of Aden and the adjacent hinterland, the Infantry Battalion, which had been disbanded in 1925, was reformed as the Aden Protectorate Levies.

Lieutenant Colonel Lake, of the Indian Army, who had previously commanded the Infantry Battalion, was recalled to raise and command this force, which was employed on the protection of airfields, Residency Guards and again provided garrisons for Perim and Kamaran. In 1929, the Camel Troop was formed.

Until 1939, the Force remained relatively unchanged, carrying out guard, garrison and ceremonial duties, but with the outbreak of the Second World War an Anti-Aircraft Wing was formed within the Aden Protectorate Levies, who then became solely responsible for the protection of Aden's airfields against attacks from both ground and air. Shortly after Italy's entry into the war in 1940, the newly formed Anti-Aircraft Wing scored its first success with the destruction of an Italian bomber over Isthmus.

In the post-war years the calls upon the Levies to carry out military action in the Western Aden Protectorate increased considerably and in 1957 the Force became the responsibility of the British Army, whereupon it was reorganised on orthodox lines.

In 1961, the Aden Protectorate Levies were handed over to the Federal Government, and were redesignated the Federal Regular Army. In 1964, the Federal Government assumed full operational and financial control.

ORGANISATION

The nature of the Federal Regular Army's tasks, coupled with its wide-spread deployment in Battalion Garrisons throughout the Federation makes three particular demands of the organisation.

Firstly, in order to maintain efficient command and control, communications within the Force must be of the highest order. The Signal Regiment maintains daily 24 hour contact between the Headquarters, Area Headquarters and all up country garrisons and troops operating anywhere in the Federation.

Secondly, bearing in mind the appalling terrain which separates these battalions from their Headquarters, the maintenance of equipment and supplies, both operational and routine, necessitates a closely co-ordinated and extremely flexible system for their provision and transportation. This is achieved by the balanced use of military transport aircraft (including helicopters) and military vehicle convoys for the movement of operational and warlike stores, and civilian charter aircraft and vehicles for the lifting of routine supplies.

Thirdly, the urgent operational movement of units from their garrison location to a particular trouble spot at minimal notice. This entails the highest possible degree of planning and co-operation at every level, and, by virtue of considerable practice over the past years, all the battalions have become adept at every conceivable method of redeployment, be it the movement of vehicles by transport aircraft, tactical moves by sub units, including descent by ropes from helicopters, or lifting of mortars over otherwise inaccessible terrain on camel back.

From 1957 until the publication of the British Defence White Paper in February 1966, the Army developed as primarily an Infantry Force, eventually having five infantry battalions and one armoured car squadron operating up country, under two Area Headquarters, overall command and control being exercised by Force Headquarters which is located in Aden together with the administrative and training units.

The backbone of the Force is, of course, its fighting battalions, whose soldiers, armed with rifles, and light machine guns must number amongst the world's most agile and best trained mountain troops, specialising in patrolling, ambush and picquettting operations.

Each battalion has its own support weapons, which include mortars, medium machine guns, anti-tank weapons and a light anti-aircraft troop equipped with heavy machine guns.

The Federal Regular Army's Armoured Car Squadron, at present equipped with Ferret Scout Cars, is responsible for patrolling the vast tracts of land which lie beyond the range of the garrison's normal sphere of influence, and for the escorting of convoys through potentially hostile territory.

Medical support exists in the form of a pool of doctors who give full time cover to operational battalions, and are available at short notice to escort casualties evacuated by air. The Royal Air Force Hospital at Khormaksar Beach, staffed by British Service doctors, assisted by Arab administrative staff and medical orderlies, attends not only sick soldiers, but also their entitled dependents.

RECRUITMENT, TRAINING AND PROMOTION

There is never any shortage of volunteers for recruitment into the Federal Regular Army. This is indicative not only of the high regard in which the Force is held throughout the Federation, but also of the fact that it can be extremely selective in its choice of recruits.

Apart from the maintenance of an overall balance within the Force, recruiting, and, indeed subsequent training and posting, is carried out without regard to tribal affiliation. The results of this policy, together with the Force's operational successes, has seen the emergence of a new loyalty to the Federal Regular Army, (and hence to the Federation), which is daily becoming stronger without in any way impinging upon the soldiers' innate tribal loyalties.

The Training Battalion at Lake Lines is responsible for most of the training in the Force. Besides recruit training, courses are run for specialists such as mortar and machine gun detachments, for NCOs and for potential officers, as well as officers' promotion courses.

Education within the Federal Regular Army is given a very high priority. The Education Centre, in addition to the provision of instructors with each battalion, runs an Apprentices' School to ensure a steady flow of potential leaders, technicians and clerks for the Force, as well as a Boys' School and a Girls' School for the children of serving soldiers.

Each year a number of specially selected officers and NCOs attend courses in the United Kingdom and elsewhere abroad, so that the Force is kept constantly in touch with the latest equipment and techniques. Several Arab officers who have recently taken up senior Staff appointments have successfully completed Staff courses at Camberley and in Jordan.

Promotion throughout the Force is based solely on ability, and officer selection, which is usually made from amongst senior NCOs who have already had considerable service experience, is carried out by a Selection Board which sets the very highest standards as regards suitability, and gives particular attention to personal integrity and educational achievements.

The high morale which exists throughout the Force may doubtless be attributed in no small measure to the attention which is paid to the welfare of the soldier and his dependents. Apart from a basic rate of pay which compares most favourably with any other Arab army, there is a pension scheme, and, on a voluntary contribution basis, a Widows Fund.

THE FUTURE

In recent years, great advances have been made towards the Arabisation of the Federal Regular Army. With the promise of Independence by 1968 this has been speeded up and continues to progress according to a carefully planned programme.

The Force still has a British Commander (Brigadier) but his Deputy is an Arab Colonel, and three other Arab Officers also hold this rank. Arab Officers command all the operational and training units and most of the administrative units. At the time of writing, there are less than 50 British Officers and 150 British Other Ranks seconded to the Force, largely in technical and advisory appointments which are rapidly "wasting out". After Independence there will remain a requirement for a small number of expatriate civilians on contract to fulfil some of these tasks.

REORGANISATION AND EXPANSION OF THE FEDERAL REGULAR ARMY

Independence by 1968 with the implicit withdrawal of the British Base and the ending of all Defence Treaties with Britain has necessitated urgent and detailed planning to rectify the imbalance within the Federal Regular Army which had, hitherto depended upon British Forces for its artillery support, operational and, to a lesser extent, logistic air support as well as for the provision of certain supplementary armoured and infantry units.

The Federal Regular Army's minimal additional requirements were studied and found to be five more infantry battalions, raising the total to ten; one artillery battery, where none had existed before; the formation of a heavy armoured car squadron to supplement the existing scout car squadron; a proportionate increase in staff and training organisations, and the formation of an engineer element.

To enable this expansion to be carried out the British Government have made a grant of £5.5 million to cover capital costs and have agreed that the sum of £10.25 million will be granted annually for three years after Independence towards maintenance costs of the Federal Forces. In both instances, these sums are to cover all arms.

Four of the five additional infantry battalions are being formed by the re-training of existing Federal Guard One Katibas (Battalions). With the aid of a small British Training Team these Katibas, whose former role as an Internal Security Force required them to function more as a form of gendarmerie than as soldiers, have proved enthusiastic and adept in preparing

for their new role. The fifth additional battalion will be formed by special recruitment and the transfer of selected personnel within the Federal Regular Army.

An artillery battery has already been formed and trained, and its four troops, equipped with the robust, well-proven British 25 pounder, will be operational by June 67.

Saladin armoured cars with which the additional armoured squadron will be equipped are shortly due to arrive. Personnel to man them have already been selected and have received training from British units similarly equipped.

The reorganisation and expansion of the Federal Regular Army, in addition to a numerical increase from approximately 5000 to 8500 all ranks, also includes the replacement of obsolescent equipment formerly in service, typical examples of this are the introduction of the 84mm Karl Gustav anti-tank weapon and the 81mm mortar to replace the former RCL weapon and 3" mortar respectively.

OTHER ARMS OF THE FEDERAL DEFENCE FORCES

Although these notes are concerned primarily with the Federal Regular Army, the following information about the future air force and the navy, both of which will operate under the Federal Defence Ministry, may be of interest.

South Arabian Air Force. This will consist of a number of BAC 167 jet aircraft with the capability of carrying rockets, cannon or machine guns, DC 3 transports, Beaver aircraft and Sioux helicopters for OP and liaison duties.

In the first instance the Commander and pilots will be expatriate civilians on contract to the Federal Government. These will be replaced gradually by Arabs of whom a number have already been selected for training. Servicing and ground maintenance of aircraft has been undertaken by a civilian organisation under contract.

South Arabian Navy. Concerned primarily with anti-smuggling and fishery protection duties this will be a small force equipped with three specially converted inshore mine-sweepers.

CONCLUSION

On the attainment of Independence by South Arabia, the Federal Forces will be in a position to prevent limited frontier incursions; to deal with tribal disputes and to maintain Internal Security. The reorganisation and expansion has, however, been based on a minimal requirement for these purposes.

To ensure the defence of South Arabia against full scale aggression clearly demands the support of either UN Forces or an appropriate Treaty with a friendly power. Whilst extremely capable of giving a good account of itself against any form of attack, the Federal Regular Army, like the army of any emergent territory, must have this ultimate assurance.

